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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

developing the property and could not reasonably have expected
unencumbered development.
Second, the court concluded that government's action was not
improper. Broadwater Farms argued that the regulation enforced by the
Corps left Broadwater Farms without compensation. It argued that the
Corps acted unreasonably, irresponsibly, and was unwilling to
compromise.
The court noted that to the extent the Corps seemed
unwilling to compromise, it was merely enforcing a regulation as ordered
by Congress. Thus, the action that left Broadwater Farms without a permit
to develop did not constitute a compensable taking. The Court entered
judgment for the government.
M. Elizabeth Lokey
Lakewood Assocs. v. United States, 45 Fed. C1. 320 (1999) (holding
Lakewood's regulatory taking claim not ripe).
Lakewood Associates ("Lakewood") purchased unimproved real estate
known as the Elbow Lake Property and the Boy Scout Tract around 1987
and 1988, respectively. Lakewood planned to use the properties for
residential development.
At the time of purchase, Lakewood had
knowledge that both properties contained wetlands. In 1991, pursuant to
the Clean Water Act, Lakewood submitted a joint application for an
individual section 404 permit to the United States Army Corps of
Engineers ("Corps") and the Virginia Marine Resources Commission
("VMRC"). Lakewood noted in its application that practicable alternative
sites existed but did not evaluate them.
At the time of the submission of the application, the permit granting
system provided for: (1) avoiding impacts to wetlands to the extent
possible; (2) minimizing them to the extent appropriate and practicable;
and (3) compensating for the creation, restoration, and/or preservation of
other wetlands. Lakewood did not offer mitigation packages for the
wetland impacts its joint application proposed. After submission of the
application, the Virginia State Water Control Board, the Fish and Wildlife
Service, and the Environmental Protection Agency all voiced concern to
the Corps that before making a decision, more information was needed
from Lakewood, including a detailed alternatives analysis and further
environmental information on the wetlands impacted. The Corps sent a
letter to Lakewood in April 1991 requesting further documentation
regarding these concerns.
Lakewood failed to respond with the
information and in September 1991, the Corps closed the permit file. In
1992, Lakewood performed a wetlands delineation that the Corps
confirmed in 1993. In 1996, Lakewood asked the Corps to extend the
1993 delineation to 1998, to which it agreed.
Then, in 1997, Lakewood filed a compliant alleging a taking of its
property occurred in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The government
asserted that since Lakewood failed to fully participate in the available
administrative permit process, the issue was not ripe for decision.
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Lakewood argued that continuing the permit process was futile and futility
excuses the requirement of a final agency decision before judicial review.
Lakewood argued that compliance with the Corps document request
was burdensome and did not serve a legitimate purpose. In Lakewood's
opinion the information requested by the Corps was too expensive and time
consuming and would do nothing to advance the approval or denial of its
permit application.
The court agreed that a plaintiff does not need to proceed with the
application process if the procedures were so burdensome as to deprive
plaintiffs of their property rights. However, the court stated that plaintiffs
could not simply plead futility when faced with long odds or demanding
procedural requirements. Without the establishment of futility, a claim that
the application of government regulation was a taking of property was not
ripe until the government reached a final decision on the application of the
regulations to the property.
The court found the information requested by the Corps both necessary
and legitimate to the permit review process. In reaching this conclusion,
the court pointed to the facts that the Corps and three other agencies
requested the information and that all the agencies felt the information
critical to determining the consequences of the practicable alternative sites.
In conclusion, the court held that Lakewood's taking claim was not
ripe for judicial review due to the absence of a final agency decision
regarding its section 404 permit application and that Lakewood failed to
establish futility in the permit process. Therefore, the court granted the
government's motion to dismiss.
Karen McTavish

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
Cabeza de Vaca Land & Cattle Co., L.L.C. v. Babbitt, 58 F. Supp.2d
1226 (D. Colo. 1999) (granting Babbitt's motion to dismiss based on lack
of subject matter jurisdiction and dismissing Cabeza's cause of action).
This case concerned the Rio Grande River Compact ("Compact"), the
connected Closed Basin Project ("Project"), and the Department of the
Interior's ("DOI") administration of the Project. In 1938, Colorado, New
Mexico, and Texas signed a compact in an effort to share water resources
of the Rio Grande River. In accordance with that agreement, Colorado
agreed to meet its obligations through the Closed Basin Project of the San
Luis Valley. The Project's plan entailed drawing water from the Closed
Basin aquifer to send to the Rio Grande.
The Reclamation Project Authorization Act of 1972 ("Act") authorized
DOI to oversee the Project. Section 102(b) of the Act limited DOI's ability
to draw water from the aquifer. Project facilities could not cause more
than a two-foot drop in water tables allocated for irrigation or in domestic

